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The purpose of this essay is to briefly sketch the economic 
environment that probably will surround the upcoming Joint Annual 
Meetings of the World Bank and IMF during the week of September 28. 
As background for this report, one might want to refer to papers 
which the Washington Office of CEPAL prepared on last year's meeting 
* t. . . 1 I of the two organizations.— 
In many respects,this year's meetings should be rather low key 
in comparison to the 1980 Conference. There are several reasons 
for this. 
First and foremost is the fact that in 1981 the world economy 
is at an uncertain crossroad: the shock of the second major adjustment 
of oil prices in 1979/1980 is now behind us and the system has shown 
signs of adjustment, although no one knows how fast and complete that 
adjustment process will be. The aftermath of the second oil shock 
was undoubtedly less devasting for the industrialized countries —which 
clearly control the tone of the Meetings— than the first onej as seen 
in figures 1 § 2, economic growth and inflation have been much less 
adversely affected in 1980 and 1981. Also, the current accounts of the 
balance of payments of the industrialized countries have not returned 
jV R. Devlin, Issues That Will Be Probably Raised at the 1980 
International Monetary Fund Annual Meeting, CEPAL/WAS/R.18, 
September 1980; R. Devlin, Issues That Will Possibly Be Raised at 
the 1980 World Bank Annual Meeting, CEPAL/WAS/R.19, September 1980 
and R. Devlin, Update on the World Bank/IMF Joint Annual Meeting, 
CEPAL/WAS/R.20, October 1980. 
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to surplus as quickly as in the first shock (see table 1), which 
means that these countries are assuming a larger share of the deficits, 
a healthy development because they are in the best position to finance 
them. Moreover, the larger industrialized countries have shown an uncanny 
ability to control or reduce deficits, making only the negative balances of 
the smaller industrialized countries seemingly intractable. 
Other bright factors from the standpoint of the industrialized 
countries is that OPEC has apparently lost, at least for now, its 
ability to sustain price increases for petroleum. Meanwhile, although 
the deficits of the non-oil developing countries are as large in real 
terms as in 1975, and still growing in nominal terms (see table 2), 
there has been in 1981 much less difficulty than expected in financing 
1/ 
them.— Finally, the impetus of NEIO and the proposals of the Brandt 
Commission seem to have lost momentum in Northern circles, and maybe in 
the South as well. In sum, there seems to be a feeling of complacency 
surrounding this year's Meeting, as compared to the excitement and 
sense of urgency that underpinned the tone of the Conference last year. 
_1/ An important barometer is Brazil. Last year there was great concern 
about Brazil's ability to finance its deficits and debt service. 
Since the country is the largest LDC debtor, there was great concern 
about its external payments prospects. But now Brazil has agreed to 
deflate its economy, and is paying very high interest margins for new 
loans; this keeps the bankers happy and likewise helps to reduce 
the tension surrounding LDC current account deficits more generally. 
Another probable factor behind the apparent correlation between 
concern about the health of Brazilian finances and LDC deficits 
in general, is that this may be the only developing country where 
foreign debt is large enough to actually threaten the stability 
of the international banking system should a default occur. 
TABLE 1 
INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES: CURRENT ACCOUNT OF THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Billions of U.S. dollars) 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Canada _ -1.6 -4.7 -4.0 -4.0 -4.1 -4.5 -1.6 -3 
U.S. 9.9 7.6 21.2 7.5 -11.3 -11.1 2.8 8.4 13 
Japan 0.1 -4.5 -0.4 3.9 11.1 18.0 -8.0 -9.5 - 1/2 
France -0.1 -4.9 1.0 -4.9 -1.6 5.2 2.9 -5.9 -7 
Germany 7.1 13.0 7.7 7.7 8.5 13.5 0.9 -8.5 -6 1/2 
Italy -2.2 -7.4 -0.2 -2.5 3.1 7.8 6.4 -9.5 -9 
U.K. -1.2 -7.2 -3.0 -0.5 1.6 4.6 1.0 10.1 12 
Other 5.8 -7.4 -4.7 -9.3 -12.8 -3.8 -12.2 -27.5 -28 1/2 
All countries 19.3 -12.4 17.1 -2.1 -5.5 30.1 -10.7 -44.0 -29.5 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, June 1981 
TABLE 2 
NON OIL-DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: CURRENT ACCOUNT OF THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Billions of U.S. dollars) 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
-11.5 -37.1 -46.5 -33.0 -28.6 -37.5 -57.6 -82.1 -97.5 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, June 1981. 
A second possible reason for the calm tone of the Meetings 
is the Reagan Administration. It is highly suspicious of multi-
lateralism, which clearly has dampened the feasibility of proposals 
for new multilateral initiatives (and funding) to tackle world problems. 
The Administration would probably stymie any attempts to expand the 
role of the Bank and maybe even the Fund. With the dollar strong in 
international foreign exchange markets, the U.S. does not even have 
to seriously consider debate over a Substitution Account in the IMF.—^ 
In sum, both the Bank and Fund may consider it appropriate to maintain a 
low profile in the current hostile environment for international 
organizations. 
A third factor for the quiet tone of the upcoming Meetings 
is that the World Bank —easily the most imaginative and visionary 
of the Bretton Woods Twins— is in a state of transition. McNamara 
has retired and the new President, Ted Clausen, just began his new work 
in July, thus he is still adjusting himself to an enormous institution 
with over 5000 talented people. It will take Clausen awhile to become 
comfortable enough to begin to put his mark on the Bank. 
It is in this context that one can better understand the environment 
surrounding the upcoming Meetings. The issues that are likely to receive 
attention are sketched in the following pages. 
THE IMF 
The Seventh Review of Quotas has been completed, increasing the basic 
resources of the Fund by 50%, and now there is preparation for an Eighth 
1/ Ironically, with the dollar so strong, this would be an ideal time 
to proceed with the Substitution Account. 
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Review. Meanwhile, the IMF just completed a 9 billion SDR borrowing 
arrangement with Saudi Arabia for 1981 and 1982, making the Fund's financial 
picture rather bright for the immediate future. It also has established 
a special loan window for shortfalls in food production, thus helping 
the Fund in its efforts to gain a better public image, especially 
in the Third World. 
The main issues likely to be raised about the Fund fall into 4 basic 
categories. 
1. Greater LDC Voting Power - The LDCs want a greater voice in the decision-
making of the IMF via increased voting power. This is an issue that 
has been on stage for several years now. However, there seemingly is little chance 
that progress will be made in this area as the industrialized countries 
have shown themselves to be unwilling tt> dilute their power without some 
big incentive, e.g. the influx of massive resources that Saudi Arabia 
used as part of its leverage to gain more voice in the Fund. Perhaps 
a more effective strategy is that suggested by Jeker; i.e. LDCs should 
work for maximum representation in Fund staff positions and maximum 
1/ 
efficiency in the appointment of skilled individuals to these positions. 
In other words, the campaign for more influence would come from inside at 
the functional level,rather than at the more problematical level of 
formal voting rights. 
1/ Rolf Jeker "Voting Rights of Less Developed Countries in the IMF", 
Journal of World Trade Law Vol. 12, No.3, May/June 1978. pp. 218-227. 
7 
2. SDR Allocation. There will be discussion of a new allocation of 
SDRs. However, the "link" to development assistance still appears 
to be a problematical issue. 
3. Soft Loan Windows. As the World Bank's excellent new World 
Development Report makes all to clear, the low income developing 
countries have fared very badly in the decade of the seventies. 
Thus, there may be a special effort to provide assistance to those 
countries. In the case of the Fund this would mean subsidies on 
the cost of balance of payments assistance, something the Fund 
has been doing via the receipts from its gold sales, but which needs to 
be done on a larger scale and on a more permanent basis. 
4« Conditionality. Conditionality has long been a source of friction 
between the IMF and developing countries. Under Laroisiere, 
the Fund has attempted to be become more sensitive on this issue, 
raising standby assistance to 450% of the new quotas, and deciding 
that it would extend adjustment programs over a 3 year period, 
with due consideration being explicitly given to the social and 
political objectives of the governments. Many —including myself— 
feel that the Fund has a long way to advance before it has an effective 
and ideologically plural design for stabilization policy. Nevertheless, 
there has been progress, as witnessed by the new Jamaican stabilization 
program, which among other things, desisted in the need for 
devaluation, normally de rigueur in an IMF program. Ironically, as 
1./ IBRD, World Development Report, 1981, Washington D.C., 1981. 
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the Fund attempts to improve its image in the Third World, 
it finds itself being subject to criticism in the industrialized 
countries to the effect that it has become too "soft". One source 
of criticism has been international commercial banks in the U.S., 
which have often viewed the Fund as their point man in efforts to 
deflate economies so that foreign exchange can be squeezed out for 
service of the debt. Thus, in the meetings, the Fund may encounter 
criticism from both the North and South on the subject of conditionality. 
THE WORLD BANK 
Nothing new is expected to develop vis-a-vis the World Bank; 
most issues will represent a continuation of the same debate that has 
developed over the past few years. 
1. The Energy Affiliate. McNamara's imaginative proposal seems to be 
in serious trouble, largely on account of opposition from the Reagan 
Administration. The EEC, the Scandanavian countries and the South support 
. the Affiliate. In the recent UN Conference on New and Renewable 
Sources of Energy, held in Nairobi, it was expressed in many circles 
that the Affiliate is a necessary vehicle for the promotion of 
new forms of energy development. But the U.S. has been very hostile 
to the concept for several reasons. 
Jij The image problem is a real one; as long as countries view the IMF 
as a "mortician" rather than a "physician", they will avoid it until 
all other options are closed. For the IMF to be effective, it must 
be in consultation with countries at an early stage of a problem, so 
that the costs of adjustment can be minimized. This will happen only 
when countries feel that the institution is working for their objectives 
and not against them. This issue is explored in greater detail in 
R. Devlin, The IMF; Physician or Mortician?, CEPAL/WAS/R.24, August 1981. 
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The first is ideological; it simply distrusts international 
organizations and feels that they promote socialism. In a recently 
y 
prepared report on the World Bank's energy lending , it argues 
that the Bank is biased towards the public sector. It also feels 
that the Bank substitutes private investment in energy, and in the 
Administration's mind the private sector can more efficiently 
develop hydrocarbon resources. In effect, the Administration's 
view is "hands off"; let the private sector develop energy. 
The second reason for the Administration's attitude is 
financial. It is attempting to cut budgetary outlays and perceives the 
Energy Affiliate as a potential source of new pressure on fiscal 
expenditure. 
The third reason is that in the U.S. there is a growing sense 
of complacency with respect to energy prices. Many feel that 
OPEC has permanently lost its grip on oil prices because high prices 
are stimulating a greater supply of petroleum; there is rapid 
development of energy substitutes; and conservation measures 
are now an integral and effective part of the national economic 
consciousness. 
Since the U.S. is the Bank's biggest member, the Affiliate 
seems to be in serious jeopardy. The IBRD may therefore have to 
plan its loans for energy within the confines of its existing 
and future regular capital authorizations. 
1/ U.S. Treasury, An Examination of the World Bank Energy Lending 
Program, July 1981. 
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2. The Poorest of the Poor. There should be much discussion of the 
plight of the lowest income developing countries. The Meetings 
will immediately follow a U.N. Conference on the Least Developed 
Countries and the World Bank's World Development Report 1981 (p.3) 
brings into stark focus the plight of these members: during the 
decade of the seventies their economies grew in per capita terms 
an average of only 0.8% per annum, compared to 3.1% for the middle 
income developing countries; in Africa, per capita incomes actually 
underwent a decline. The prospects are particularly dismal for 
Africa as the low case scenario of the Bank projects an average 
1.0% per annum decline in GNP per capita in the 80s, while the high 
case provides for practically no growth. The low and high cases 
for the middle income countries are average growth rates of 2.1% 
and 3.4% per annum, respectively. The Report (p.56) also shows 
the inherent discrimination in aid flows to the lowest income 
countries: In 1979 low income countries (excluding China) —whose 
share of the developing countries population was 55%— received 
only 37% of ODA given by OECD and OPEC Countries". Most of the 
discrimination has its roots in bilateral aid flows: 65% of bilateral 
aid in 1979 was channeled to middle income developing countries. 
In addition, as the Bank points out, there is a severe bias in 
bilateral aid flows to middle income countries: Israel and Egypt 
absorbed 2.5 billion dollars in aid (largely from the U.S.) 
which is $58 per person and 7.2% of GNP; meanwhile, 
OPEC channelled the bulk of its aid to Jordan and Syria, and French 
aid was granted mostly to its overseas territories. Thus, aside 
from a much needed increase of aid flows, there should be discussion 
of a more equitable distribution of existing aid flows. Of course, 
the replenishment of IDA is an integral part of this debate. 
The Private Sector and C6-finanelng. The U.S. will undoubtedly 
express its feeling that the Bank should begin to better attend 
to the private sector» It is already known that the U.S. Treasury 
is doing a study on the bank to determine whether its lending has 
fostered socialism in the developing world. To the Reagan group, 
the public sector is synonymous with inefficiency, and the World 
Bank of course does most of its business with governments. 
As an integral part of this general concept, there may 
be more active debate over co-financing with the private banks. 
In effect, the World Bank would attempt to do more parallel lending 
with the private banks. One argument voiced for co-financing, is that 
it will allow the World Bank to better husband its resources and 
thereby forestall requirements for more financial support. 
Other issues. There will likely be discussion of the need for 
more structural adjustment lending, and possibility of changing the 
capital leveraging ratio of the Bank from its present restrictive 
level of 1:1. Clausen has already expressed the opinion that a change 
in this ratio might be appropriate in light of the future demands 
on the banks resources. 
In sum, at this point in time there is no big new issue on 
the horizon for the World Bank. The debate should focus on subjects 
which have been raised in past meetings. The only clearly new 
dimension might be the ideological struggle over public vs private 
allocation of resources. 
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THE FACTOR OF THE U.S. ECONOMY 
Viewed in a more general way, the tone of the Meetings also may be 
influenced by recent developments in the U.S. economy.One possible reason 
for the apparent lull in the debate over the world economy is a "wait-and-see" 
attitude on the economic policies of the U.S., the biggest and most 
influential economy among IBRD-IMF members. Reagan's policies of supply 
side economics are confusing to many, yet since conventional policy has not 
been very effective, the government seems to be receiving the benefit of the 
doubt in many circles. 
At least by conventional Keynesian standards, the Administration's policies 
seem unusual, and biased towards economic stagnation rather than the spurt 
in growth that has been promised by advocates of supply side economics. 
The government's success in simultaneously bringing about tax and 
spending cuts is not to be underestimated; it was a brilliant maneuver that 
surprised many by the ease with which it was effected. But conventional 
wisdom would suggest that,all things being equal, the tax and expenditure 
reductions of roughly equal magnitude will be deflationary by a factor of one. 
Unless there are further budget cuts, however, the objective of a balanced 
budget by the mid-1980s will be difficult to realize because of an ambitious 
defense program, and an expected slowdown in economic growths which will 
further reduce tax revenue and raise expenditure via the so-called automatic fiscal 
stabilizers. Thus the projected deficit of $42 billion dollars in 1982 
could very well reach as high as 60-70 billion dollars. An increased deficit would 
mean that the weight of the anti-inflationary program will continue to be borne 
by monetary policy, which would tend to keep interest rates very high. 
High interest rates would of course work against the recovery that the 
Administration promises to be just around thecorner. 
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The Administration does not view economics in a conventional way , however, 
and therefore does not see economic stagnation as the outcome of its policies. 
First, it would be argued that the tax cuts will provide much needed 
incentive for investment. The tax cuts were in fact embarassingly skewed 
towards upper income brackets, which have higher propensities to save. 
Normally, one might question whether low growth, excess capacity and high 
interest rates might not inhibit investment. But the Administration seems 
to believe that a dollar saved automatically equates with a dollar of 
productive investment. 
Second, while the fiscal deficit could reach the record level of 1975, 
the Administration views the economy as being larger, now and even in the 
worst circumstances (60-70 billion dollars) the deficit will equal only 2% of GNP, 
not large enough to inhibit a fall in interest rates. But this overlooks 
the fact that in 1975 monetary policy was accommodating deficits, while today 
it is very restrictive, which could make government finance disruptive 
in capital markets and help to sustain higher real rates even in the face 
of economic slack. Also, longer term inflationary- expectations among investors 
have not abated as much as the short term rates of inflation, thus giving 
further impetus to high real rates of interest.—^ The Administration appears 
to recognize this danger, and now is contemplating further budget cuts. 
However, the cuts must further attack social programs, which could meet resistance 
in Congress. 
JL/ Investors are very concerned about prospects of large fiscal deficits and 
their inflationary consequences. Growing defense expenditures in the face 
of already programmed multi-year tax cuts will induce deficits. The 
estimates of these deficits continue to rise. While 60 billion dollars 
is now the most often cited figure, some have mentioned 100 billion dollars 
as a possibility. The increasing debate over deficits adversely affects 
inflationary expectations even in the face of some recent.slackening 
of consumer price increases. 
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The center piece of the economic program is tight monetary policy. 
The consequent high interest rates have Europeans very concerned, because they 
must keep their domestic interest rates very high in order to stem 
. capital outflow and weakening exchange rates.—^ They will undoubtedly 
continue to express this concern in the Meetings. 
The Europeans are, of course, very nervous about the social consequence 
of slower growth. Unemployment is a sensitive issue there, and it is 
not surprising that politicians on the left seem to be undergoing 
a revitalization of their prospects for gaining power in government. 
The Reagan Administration does not suffer from this problem, as the 
policies being introduced by it are new and a U.S. public, desperate 
for change of any sort, has assumed a wait-and-see attitude on the current 
economic program. Reagan's seemingly-contradictory objectives of 
simultaneously increasing growth and lowering inflation may run into 
trouble; the result may be stagnation with less than dramatic gains 
on the inflationary front, much like England. However, should the program 
fail, or involve very high social costs in the attainment of reduced 
inflation, the political consequences would probabaly not begin to appear 
until after 1982. Thus the Europeans and the U.S. are today facing 
different domestic political climates and this may be a source of 
lively debate in the Meetings. 
JJ The weakening exchange rates have caused a "third oil shock" for 
Europe, as the local currency price of dollar denominated oil has 
undergone a sharp increase. 
"APERTURA" 
The subject of "apertura" may be highlighted in discussions. The 
World Bank's World Development Report 1981 makes a very stmig pitch 
for policies that pursue open economies with respect to trade and finance. 
It points to the fact that countries that had outward-looking policies 
were most successful in coping with the difficult economic environment of 
the 1970s. 
I think few would take issue with the argument that policies 
directed at greater participation in trade can improve the allocation 
of resources and growth; under proper circumstances competition is 
healthy for the individual spirit as well as the national spirit. 
Also, aside from theoretical merits, in the difficult economic 
environment that we have today, concern about export performance 
has its own internal logic. However, in my view the Bank's suggestions 
for policy may be insufficiently qualified with regard to the short and 
medium term problems that will be encountered with such a strategy. 
First, it seems to understimate the difficulty of exporting in 
a world environment of low economic growth. Assuming that South-South 
trade can grow only gradually due to institutional obstacles, what would 
happen if all countries pursued the aggresive export policies of South 
Korea? Over the long run there might be prospects for a better 
allocation of resources in developing countries through trade, but in 
the short and medium term obstacles such as protectionism in the North 
—brought on by a wave of new LLC exports— might stymie the process. 
In other words, the slow growth in the North could induce very high 
adjustment costs if all LDCs shift to more open economies. This could 
be alleviated through structural adjustment loans, but there is no 
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prospect that the World Bank will have resources sufficient to attend to 
more than but a handful of countries. This leaves countries reliant on 
commercial banks. But will the banks be a reliable source of finance in the 
1980s? Will the banks lend to middle and lower income developing countries 
as they have to the upper income countries that now are their principal clients? 
Are there any special costs or risks associated with reliance on the banks 
for credit? These are all questions which need to be answered in greater 
detail. 
Second, there is one possible serious adjustment cost which is hidden 
in the "economistic" approach of the analysis on outward looking policies. 
Is it any coincidence that at least 6 of the 8 countries that the Bank cites 
(p.75) as having had successful adjustment by outward looking policies are 
also noted for having harsh authoritarian governments? Is it any coincidence 
that 11 of the 13 countries cited (p.75) for inward looking policies are 
democratic governments, governments moving toward democracy, or "soft" 
authoritarian regimes where there is a considerable degree of political 
participation? In fact, competing in international markets and maintaining 
the confidence of international bankers often require policies that repress 
real wages and labor organization. Trade may increase employment under 
certain circumstances but suppression of wages and the perrogatives of labor 
may also be socially very disruptive and full of unforeseen costs.—^ 
Whether outward looking policies in developing countries require 
authoritarian regimes, is an empirical question, but I think that the 
causual correlation is so strong that it shouldn't be hidden in the economic 
analysis. The possibility of this social cost should be made explicit for 
those countries that might be contemplating such a strategy. This is 
JJ Some of the potential socio-economic effects of outward looking policies 
can be found in Hector Assael "La Internacionalización de la Economias 
Latinoamericanas: Algunas Reservas" Revista de la Cepal, No.7, April 1979, 
pp. 43-58. 
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especially true for developing countries with democratic traditions. 
Finally, after examining the results of outward and inward looking 
policies, the bank concludes that in the 80s countries "should move toward 
policies that provide equal encouragement to export and domestic production...." 
But this presupposes that balance is a realistic objective, when in practice 
countries might have to pass through alternating cycles of import substitution 
and export promotion. Thus the bank seems to underestimate a potential 
mutual dependence between import substitution and export promotion.—^ 
In sum, the Bank's analysis is very good and to the point, although 
it might be overselling the benefits of outward looking policies and not giving 
adequate attention to the costs and socio-economic obstacles to such a 
strategy. 
INTERDEPENDENCE 
The common theme of both the IMF's World Economic Outlook and the 
IBRD's World Development Report is interdependence. However, while the 
defense policies of the industrialized countries seem to increasingly respect 
this principle, there is evidence that cooperation on the economic front 
is far from optimal. The U.S. seems suspicious of multilateralism and 
the very international organizations that could help bring about adjustments 
in energy dependence, finance and trade. There seems to be a drift 
backwards towards the bilateralism of the 50s, when a strong U.S. dollar 
and foreign private investment were the favored palliatives to world 
economic problems. Moreover, the tone here could be interpreted as 
"what is good for the U.S., is good for the world." Only time will tell 
whether this step backwards in time will work, but the conflict 
1/ It mentions Brazil as a case where import substitution played an important 
_ role in the export of manufactures. But it is unclear whether the Bank 
views this as a special case, or a feasible strategy that other countries 
could pursue. 
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between the apparent need for interdependent policy formation 
and the increasing stress on bilateral solutions to problems, 
could introduce an interesting element of debate in the Meetings. 


